Firewalls use packet filtering to either accept or deny packets on the basis of a set of predefined rules called filters. The firewall forms the initial layer of defense and protects the network from unauthorized access. However, maintaining firewall policies is always an error prone task, because the policies are highly complex. Conflict is a misconfiguration that occurs when a packet matches two or more filters. The occurrence of conflicts in a firewall policy makes the filters either redundant or shadowed, and as a result, the network does not reflect the actual configuration of the firewall policy. Hence, it is necessary to detect conflicts to keep the filters meaningful. Even though geometry-based conflict detection provides an exhaustive method for error classification, when the number of filters and headers increases, the demands on memory and computation time increase. To solve these two issues, we make two main contributions. First, we propose a topology-based conflict detection system that computes the topological relationship of the filters to detect the conflicts. Second, we propose a systematic implementation method called BISCAL (a bit-vector-based spatial calculus) to implement the proposed system and remove irrelevant data from the conflict detection computation. We perform a mathematical analysis as well as experimental evaluations and find that the amount of data needed for topology is only one-fourth of that needed for geometry.
Introduction
A firewall protects the network from unauthorized access and provides secure access to the outside world. Packet filtering techniques in a firewall provide an initial level of security and operate on the network layer or the internet layer. Packet filtering controls the network traffic with a predefined, ordered set of filters called a firewall policy (FP) . Every filter f in the FP has a condition and an action. If a filter matches a packet P the filter action is carried out on packet P. The action can be either accept or deny the packet. Many packet filtering schemes such as IPFW or IPFIREWALL in FreeBSD is a first matching filtering scheme [1] . IPFW is a FreeBSD sponsored firewall software application enables use of sophisticated filtering capabilities.
Managing and maintaining firewall policies is an extremely complicated job for the network administrator because the policies are constantly subject to modification. For example, while examining 37 firewalls in production enterprise networks, Wool found that all the firewalls were misconfigured and vulnerable [2] .
When the network behavior is different from the actual configuration of a policy, potential security holes are created. For example, if an IP address is mistaken in an FP, it allows unintended traffic in the network and can cause security holes. A conflict is a type of misconfiguration that occurs when a packet P matches two or more filters. It is a common misconfiguration in firewalls. Hamed et al. found that there is a high probability of even expert system administrators and network practitioners creating conflicts [3] . Conflicts render the filters redundant or shadowed, and as a result, the actual configuration of the firewall policy is not reflected in the network.
Various techniques have been developed to manage firewall policies [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Among these are firewall analysis tools [4, 5] and techniques that focus on minimizing the firewall rules [6] . Other related works detect conflicts by using geometrical analysis [7] [8] [9] . Yin et al. developed a conflict detection technique based on geometrical analysis, which provides systematic conflict classifica-tion [8] . However, this technique becomes very demanding in terms of memory and computation time when the number of header fields and filters increases. To solve this problem, we have presented a topological approach to detect conflicts [10, 11] . In this approach, we introduced a bit-vector based spatial calculus named BISCAL and constructed a new conflict detection framework through BISCAL which analyzes the topological relationship of the filters to detect and classify conflicts. This paper extends and strengthens that framework by describing the design and implementation of the topology-based conflict detection system that shows how effectively the BISCAL can be adopted for conflict detection and by presenting quantitative evaluations of the system. In this paper, our main contributions are as follows:
1) We have presented a systematic implementation method based on BISCAL to construct a conflict detection system that efficiently classifies conflicts by treating with topological relationships between filters effectively, and can remove the irrelevant data from the conflict detection in the intermediate stage of computation.
2) We have performed comparative studies through mathematical and experimental analysis to show that the topological approach requires much less computation time and storage than geometrical approach in conflict detection.
We implement the topological approach using BIS-CAL to extract the conflicting filters from the firewall policy. The main advantage of BISCAL is that the operations on the filter sets become easier. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related works. In Section 3, we explain the firewall policy used in the conflict detection system. Section 4 discusses the spatial relationship of the filters, and Section 5 explains the conflict classification in detail. The operators and supporting vectors of BISCAL are explained in Section 6. Section 7 gives an overview of the proposed system and its computational steps. The evaluation and comparative analysis of our approach are discussed in Section 8. And finally, in Section 9, we present the conclusions and discuss future research directions.
Related Work
Over the past few years, research and analysis of firewall policies has received considerable attention . AlShare et al. proposed an algorithm to detect conflicts caused by one filter on another in a firewall policy on the basis of the relationship between the two filters [12] . This relationship was defined according to their predicates such that they satisfied the conditions in {⊂ ⊃ =}. However, the problem with this algorithm is that when the corresponding predicates of two filters overlap, the relationship between the two filters cannot be determined, because overlapping predicates do not satisfy any of the conditions in{⊂ ⊃ =}. Therefore, the algorithm for detecting conflicts also does not work when overlapping predicates appear between two filters.
V. Capretta et al. proposed a formalization of conflict detection for firewalls. They defined conflict for the rules if and only if the actions of the rules are different [13] . In such conflict detection, redundancy cannot be detected, as the redundant filters have the same action, but our system analyzes the filters with both the same and different actions, and conflicts are classified in detail.
Mayer et al. developed a firewall analysis tool Fang to perform customized queries on a set of filters and to extract the filters in a firewall policy [4] . Wool et al. improved the usability of Fang [5] . These tools and methods help administrators to manually verify the correctness of a firewall policy. Unfortunately, they require a high degree of user expertise to write proper queries and identify the problems in firewall policies.
H. G. Verizon et al. proposed a fast and scalable method for resolving the anomalies in firewall policies [14] , which can be useful for large-scale firewall policies. H. Hu et al. proposed a firewall anomaly management and resolution environment: FAME, and developed a grid-based visualization of the firewall policy [15]. Liu et al. used firewall decision trees to detect and remove the redundant filters [16] . K. Matsuda proposed a model called matrix decomposition to analyze the filters in the firewall policy with a few compression methods [17] . If for some reason, an administrator needs to intentionally embed redundant filters, which will conflict with the other filters in a firewall policy, we will inform the administrator of the presence of conflicts instead of removing these redundant filters. This also helps the administrators to add, delete, or modify the existing filters according to their own intentions, as we have classified the conflict contents in detail.
T. Srinivasan et al. proposed a scalable and parallel packet classification method using an aggregated bit vector [24] . Lakshman et al. proposed high-speed policy-based packet forwarding using bit-level parallelism [25] . Both the above methods yield good results by using the bit-vector data structure for packet classification schemes. Baboescu et al. proposed a fast and scalable conflict detection technique for packet classifiers using a bit-vector. It detects the conflicting pairs, but it does not classify the conflicts explicitly [22] . Our method efficiently utilizes the bit-vector in our conflict detection system through BISCAL and explicitly classifies as errors and warnings, which helps administrators to re-configure the policies more easily.
The commonly used matching keys in a header are protocol (represented as Pro), source IP (SrcIP), destination IP (DesIP), source port (SrcPort), and destination port (DesPort).
Each predicate
represented as an exact value, a prefix, a range value, or a list in many firewall systems. However, in this paper, we use range value for the sake of simplicity and because a filter with predicates in other forms can be easily converted into one or multiple filters with range values. Each predicate
ik , by using a uniform range value and the value in the k th key field of the packet header, u k . The default filter is the lowest priority filter that denies access to all the packets when no other filter matches the packet.
We represent a filter in the form called internal form, which includes the range values instead of the predicates in n key fields. An internal form filter f i is represented as follows:
Assume that the values of the header of packet P are represented as . A packet P matches f i if and
. An example policy consisting of internal form filters is shown in Table 1 , where f 5 is the default filter.
Spatial Relationship of Filters
According to Max J. Egenhofer, we can classify the spatial relationships on the basis of the spatial concepts [29] . The three relationships are 1) topological relationships, 2) spatial and strict order relationships, and 3) metric (geometric) relationships. Here, we focus on geometric and topological relationships and analyze how they differ in terms of conflict detection. 
Geometric Relationship of Filters
Max J. Egenhofer stated that metric relationships are based on parameters such as distance and directions of the objects [29] . Finding the metrics of an object has many applications in the field of telecommunication, medical imaging, robot motion planning, etc. For example, multidimensional packet classification is viewed as a point location problem in computational geometry. Finding the geometric location of a packet in an n-dimensional space is necessary to classify a packet in packet classification techniques [23] [24] [25] [26] . The n-dimensional space is otherwise called as packet space. When the number of key fields in a packet is n, the packet can be represented as a point in n-dimensional space or packet space. A filter is represented as a subspace of a packet space, called the filter space FS, which includes all the points of the packet that match the filter. The geometric shape of the filters in a two-dimensional space is a rectangle, and in an n-dimensional space, it is a hypercube or n-cube. The sample firewall policy in Table 1 is represented spatially in Figure 1 .
We perform a spatial decomposition of the n-dimensional space until dividing the filter boundaries reaches its last dimension. The final decomposed space is called a subspace S i . The packet classification techniques in [23] [24] [25] [26] preserve the subspaces and their locations in the n-dimensional space in various data structures to classify the packet in n key fields. In packet classification, the location of a subspace in the n-dimensional space is essential for finding which filter matches which packet. However, conflict detection techniques that find conflicting filters preserve the same data as packet classification techniques [7] [8] [9] . D. Eppstein et al. used orthogonal range searching techniques and proposed techniques for the packet classification problem and the conflict detection problem simultaneously [7] . Yin et al. detected the conflicting filters that appear in [8] by dividing the filter space using SIERRA, a systolic filter sieve array used in high-speed packet classifiers [23] .
Both the above techniques detect the conflicting filters based on packet classification analysis. However, when the number of key fields and filters increases, the conventional methods used in [7] [8] [9] are extremely demanding in terms of memory and computation time, as they depend on geometry-based packet classification techniques. As far as conflicts are concerned, rather than using packet classification, we should focus on filter classification. Therefore, in our paper, we propose to focus only on filter classification and therefore solve the drawbacks of the previous approaches based on the geometrical relationship of the filters.
Topological Relationship of Filters
According to Max J. Egenhofer, topological relationships are a subset of spatial relationships [29] . Topological notations include the concepts of continuity, closure, interior, and boundary, and are defined in terms of neighborhood relations. Topological equivalence is a crucial criterion when comparing the relationships between objects. Topological equivalence does not preserve distances and directions. Topology refers to the way in which the filters are connected to each other. Therefore, filter classification can be performed by identifying the topological relationship of the filters, which is the basic requirement for conflict detection.
In our approach, as we have discussed earlier, we perform the n-dimensional spatial decomposition, and then further analyze the filters in the subspaces to find the topological relationships of the filters. The difference between the number of subspaces required for conflict detection using topology and geometry is explained below. Geometry-based systems consider all the subspaces for conflict detection, as the location of all the subspace is important for packet classification techniques. In a topology-based system, the location is discarded, and concentrates only on the uniqueness of the subspace. In other words, it only selects the subspaces with different filter sets by removing subspaces with the same filter sets.
Therefore, the number of subspaces (the amount of data required for conflict detection) is smaller for topology-based systems than for geometry-based systems.
For example, in Figure 1 , the number of subspaces considered in the geometrical approach is thirteen. In the topological approach, it is five, because there are only five unique subspaces with different filter sets, namely
As a result, when the number of filters and key fields increase, the difference in the number of subspaces considered for conflict detection varies drastically between the topological and geometrical approaches. Therefore, we can say that identifying only the topological relationships improves the efficiency of the conflict detection system by removing the irrelevant data from the conflict computation. In this way, we can achieve our target of solving the two issues, namely, large memory usage and computation time. We use experiments to verify this in later sections.
Conflict detection is performed by finding the topological relationship of the filters. There are nine possible topological relations between any two objects, as they appeared in [29] . We have extracted five topological relationships (TR) to identify conflicts between any pair of filters, i f and j f . In other words, TR (f i , f j ) = {dis-joint, inside, contains, equal, overlap}. The relations are shown in two dimensions in Figure 2 , and can be generalized for higher dimensions. The filter space of a filter f is represented by FS (f). Table 1 . 
Classification of Conflicts
Conflicts are classified in filter pairs,   , i j f f , where i < j and filter f j has an error or warning caused by f i . The errors and warnings of the filter f j can be classified exclusively by the type of topology between f j and f i and the actions of f j and f i as follows.
1) Shadowing error:
A filter f j has a shadowing error caused by f i when a) TR (
In this case, the filter f j is never executed, as f i prevents f j from matching all the packets.
2) Redundancy error: A filter f j has a redundancy error caused by f i when a) TR (
In this case, the filter f j is never executed, as the filter f i prevents f j from matching all the packets that f j can match. The redundant filters in the FP unnecessarily increase the size of the FP, and even removing f j does not change the semantics of FP.
3) Correlation warning: A filter f j has a correlation warning caused by f i when
If filter f j has a correlation warning caused by f i , f j is sometimes not executed for the packets that match the filter f i .
4) Generalization warning:
A filter f j has a generalization warning caused by f i when
The filter f j is executed only when packets arrive that does not satisfy f i .
5) Redundancy warning:
A filter f j has a redundancy warning caused by f i when a) TR (
The filter f j is sometimes executed, as f i prevents f j from matching some packets that can match f j . However, if a filter f j is disjoint to the other filters, then it does not fall within any of the above conflict classifications. In this case, we refer to it as a neither error nor warning filter.
BISCAL
BISCAL operates on the filter sets to extract the topological relationship of the filters. It treats the filter sets in a bit-vector format and uses seven primitive operators to find the topological relationship of the filters and three special vectors called characterization vectors to preserve the intermediate results. The main advantage of BISCAL is that it finds the disjoint filters in the intermediate stage of computation and removes those filters from the conflict computation. This is because a filter that is disjoint in any dimension is always disjoint in n dimensions. are selected from FP0, then the bit-vector is [01011] . Because this paper focuses on bit-vectors, hereinafter we will refer to a bit-vector as simply vector. The main reason for choosing the bit-vector representation is that it makes easier to apply logical operations to find the topological relationships between the filters. We introduce a function V2S that transforms the 1 s in the vector to its corresponding filters. For example, V2S ([11100]) = {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 }.
Primitive Operators
There are seven primitive operators in BISCAL that compute the topological relationships of the filters. 
7) Permutation Operator (PO):
This operator returns a set from two filter sets in which each filter is a filter selected from each of two input filter sets. For example, PO ({f 0 }, {f 1 , f 2 }) = {{f 0 , f 1 }, {f 0 , f 2 }}.
Characterization Vectors
Characterization vectors are the vectors that characterize the topological relationship of the filters. There are two types of characterization vectors: 1) vectors characterizeing the topological relationship of the filters in the packet space, called CV and, 2) vectors characterizing the topological relationship of the filters projected on each axis of the packet space, called PCV.
Characterization Vectors for Filters in the
Packet Space CVs characterize the topological relationship of the filters in n-dimensional packet space. They consist of the following three kinds of vectors.
1) Co-Existence Vectors Set (OVS):
OV is a vector in which a bit of the vector is 1 if the corresponding filter co-exists with another filter in some subspace of the packet space. OVS is a set of all OVs. For example, in 
Characterization Vectors for Projections of
Filters on Each Axis of the Packet Space PCVs are computed by using the projection of the filters on each axis of the packet space. The 1 m is an ordered set of the i th predicates of the filters in FP and the projection of the filters on the i th axis of the packet space corresponding to the i th key, X i . All the projected filters except for the default filter are decomposed in the boundaries specified by their i th predicate. As a result of the decomposition, the axis is divided into multiple intervals. intervals on the i th axis except the empty sets form a set, named SFS i . Each sub-domain filter set is transformed into a vector, and as a result, the SFS i is transformed into a set of vectors, SVS i . If a filter f i exists in a sub-domain filter set, the corresponding bit of the vector b i is set to 1. Figure 3 , f 2 is a non-fully covered filter, because f 2 is alone in I 2 . In this way, the corresponding bits of non-fully covered filters are made 0, and the fully covered vector PFV i is derived. The TR extractor calculates the topological relationship among all combinations of two filters in the FP using BISCAL and classifies them into two types of errors, three types of warnings and others (neither errors nor warnings), as explained in Section 5.
CV Extractor
CV Extractor calculates the CVs using the PCV i The computation of the last three steps is taken over by BISCAL. It extracts the topological relationships for all the combinations of two filters from the CVs, and classifies them into five types of conflicts and others (neither error nor warning filters). The last three steps are explained in detail in the following subsections.
, calculated in the previous subsection. Before the computation of the CVs, we remove the already computed disjoint filters from
and PFV i  . Using this technique, we improve our system efficiency, as unnecessary computations are removed by discarding
. . possibilities to make a filter pair with disjoint filters during the computation. We introduce a vector DV , in which the value of a bit of the vector is 1 if the sponding filter is disjoint in an corre simi y one dimension. It is lar to DV because a bit in DV is 1 if the corresponding filter is disjoint on the ndimensional space, but is different from DV in that a bit in might be 0 if the corresponding filter is disjoint on the n-dimensional space. The POVS i and PFV i calculated previous subsection are replaced with i OVS DV in the  and FV, respectively. Here, a bit becomes "0" if the corresponding filter is shown to be a disjoint filter in DV , in r to improve the efficiency of the computation. 
TR Extra
O ctor ulates the sets of filter pairs, CCTP and CCTP topology , so that we can obtain the topological relationships for all the filter pairs in the firewall policy
The TR Extractor calc from the above sets, and apply the rules for conflict classification defined in Section 5. Filter pairs that have the conflict causing topology are defined in CCTP as follows:
Two filter pairs that have the same topological relationship a defined in CCTP topology in more detail, as follows:
where "topology" is one of inside, contains, equal, or overlap.
For example:
putation of disjoint filters The disjoint filters are computed in the DF as follows:
Step 5-2: Compu P ∪ PF (v); For example, the CCTP of FP1 is as follows:
Step 5 
Evaluation
matical analysis w a prototype of our system in JAVA programming language and then performed an experimental analysis to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed system.
Mathematical Analysis
As we have discussed earlier, th spaces required to find the relationship between the filters. The basic difference in geometry and topology is that topology considers only the unique subspaces, whereas geometry considers all the subspaces. Therefore, the computation time and memory requirements for a topology-based approach are less than that of a geometry-based approach. But in general, it is difficult to mathematically analyze the difference between the computation time and memory requirements in geometry and topology-based approaches. Therefore, we selected an example policy, FPA, which includes a lot of conflicts, with each and every filter is symmetrical to each other, and every filter conflicting with all the other filters. The two-dimensional spatial representation of FPA with 3 filters is shown in Figure 5 (a) and m + 1 filter is shown in Figure 5(b) .
In Figure 5 (a), for sake of simplicity, we have represented each sub aces with the same filter sets (non-unique subspaces) are represented by a single numerical digit. For example, the number zero refers the subspace of filter f 0 , and the number four represents the subspace with filters {f 1 , f 2 }. Firstly, we compare the difference between the number of subspaces in Figure 5(a) . The computation of conflicts through topological approach requires only six subspaces, whereas the geometrical approach requires all thirteen subspaces for conflict detection. Likewise, if new filters are added by preserving the symmetrical structure, as shown in Figure 5(b) , we derived the difference in subspaces required for the topology and geometry approaches for Figure 5 .
When an m + 1 th filter is added in FPA, the number of new subspaces increases by four tal and there exists m + 1 number of unique subspaces following the sum of natural number series. Therefore in topological approach, when the m + 1 th filter is added, the number of subspaces considered for conflict detection is m + 1. However, in the geometrical approach, when the m + 1 th filter is added, the total number of subspaces considered is four times the value of m. We can derive the following equations for the number of subspaces NS i for both approaches.
Topology: tional geometry-based approaches [7] [8] [9] . Our experiments were performed on Intel (R) Core (TM) i5 750 @ 2.6 2.67 GHz w 00GM RAM g on Win profession con-FPA FPB.
GHz ith 4. runnin dows 7 al. We and
Geometry:
ducted experiments with two policies, FPA is the policy discussed in the previo
m us subsection, and FPB is a synthetic firewall policy, which is generated by adding a large number of filters to a small practical firewall. We have developed FPB based on the practical firewall policy being used in our lab. It consists of 99 packet filters of 5 dimensions, with 32-bit SrcIP, DesIP addresses, 16-bit SrcPort, DesPort numbers, and an 8-bit protocol. The synthetic firewall policy (FPB) ranges in size from 100 to 1000. In this paper, like other firewall management techniques [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , we did not consider the stateful filters for experimental evaluation. The treatment of conflict detection in stateful firewalls is a topic for future work. We conducted three experiments with both FPA and FPB.
Exp.1: Comparative performance analysis of topology and geometry [7] [8] [9] 
We have substituted different values of , and tabulated the number of subspaces in Table 2 . Our mathem xperimental Analysis y performing a comparative analysis between the proposed system and convenNumb y m atical analysis shows that the number of subspaces for the topology approach is nearly one-fourth of the geometrical approach in two-dimensional space. The difference between the topology approach and the geometry approach is much larger when the dimension increases. In practical firewall policies, the efficiency of the topology approach is extremely high, because BISCAL removes the disjoint filters in the intermediate computation itself. We verify these using experiments in the next section.
E
system behavior in practical firewall policies by varying the number of filters in FPB.
In the three experiments, we h We have evaluated our system b ave measured parameters such as memory and computation time. Memory is compared by examining the number of subspaces system performs better than the geometrical approach. Exp.2 is performed by varying the ratio of the wildcards of the input filters, as shown in Figures 7(a) nd  (b) . T sysm behaves with different kinds of polices used in variy va a his analysis is performed to examine how the te ous environments. We have synthesized various FPs b rying the distribution of wildcards in FPB. We found that the computation time is less when the ratio of wildcards is in two extremes. When the ratio of wildcards is high, most of the filters occupy the n-dimensional space. As a result, there are only a few unique subspaces for conflict detection, as most of the subspaces have the same set of filters. When the ratio of wildcards is too low, most of the filters become disjoint to the others, and therefore the number of conflicting subspaces is less. Therefore the memory and computation time is less for lower and higher percentages of wildcards.
Exp.3 is performed using FPB to examine the system behavior with practical firewall policies. When the number of filters is increased, the system requires a reasonable computation time and memory when detecting conflicts, as shown in Figures 8(a) and (b) . For example, the system takes only 100 seconds to detect and classify the conflicts for m = 500.
Conclusions and Future Work
Our proposed topology-based conflict detection system detects the conflicts in FP and classifies them efficiently. Copyright © 2011 SciRes. IJCNS cal approaches and efficiently utilizes the two important resources: computation time and memory. Our future research plan focuses on the detection of conflicts caused by combinations of filters in firewall policies and conflict detection in stateful firewalls [28] .
